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Abstract 
Over the past decade, household debt (as a share of household income) has reached 
historically high levels. This has raised concerns about whether, as a result of the 
rise in debt, households are now more financially ‘fragile’. 
Using data from the 1998/99 Household Expenditure Survey (HES), a logit model 
is constructed to examine the relationship between the probability of being 
financially constrained and the economic and demographic characteristics of 
households in Australia. We find that the probability of a household being 
constrained is significantly affected by demographic and economic variables such 
as age, marital status, home ownership, weekly household income, the proportion 
of income earned from interest, and the share of income going to repayments on 
mortgage debt. Unfortunately, however, we cannot separately identify households 
with investor housing debt and so cannot examine the relationship between this 
component of household debt and the probability of being financially constrained. 
We also apply the model to data from the 1993/94 HES and the 2001 Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Our results imply 
that the overall proportion of households who are financially constrained in the 
economy has fallen or, at worst, remained unchanged between 1994 and 2001. 
Separating households into financially constrained and unconstrained groups, we 
find that much of the rise in debt appears to have been due to unconstrained 
households taking on more debt. As such, the rise in the aggregate debt to income 
ratio associated with owner-occupier mortgages appears to be the result of 
voluntary household choice rather than a result of increased household financial 
distress. Hence, the increase in owner-occupier mortgage debt has not been 
associated with an increase in the proportion of households who are financially 
constrained. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D12, E52 
Keywords: household debt, household surveys, households, 
liquidity constraints, HILDA, HES ii 
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A TALE OF TWO SURVEYS: HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND 
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN AUSTRALIA 
Gianni La Cava and John Simon 
1.  Introduction 
Over the past decade, household debt (as a share of household income) has reached 
historically high levels. Between December 1990 and September 2002 the ratio of 
household debt to disposable income more than doubled from 50.5 per cent to 
122 per cent (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Household Debt
(a) 
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This rise has been commented upon widely, including by The Economist, which 
remarked: 
The profligacy of American and British households is legendary, but Australians 
have been even more reckless, pushing their borrowing to around 125 per cent of 
disposable income…there are now concerns that unsustainable rates of borrowing 
will sooner or later end in tears. (‘Living in never-never land’, The Economist, 
9 January 2003). 
Despite the intuitive appeal of a link between a rise in aggregate household debt to 
income ratios and financial fragility, there are a number of important 
considerations. For example, it matters who is holding the additional debt. If the 
run-up in debt is caused by lending to people with above-average capacity to 
service the additional debt at conservative loan-to-house valuation ratios there 
would be relatively little cause for concern. 
This paper seeks to shed light on this issue by referring to household level surveys 
that provide detailed information on household debt and financial constraints. As 
alluded to above, it may be that the rise in the aggregate debt to income ratio has 
been accompanied by an increase in the proportion of financially constrained 
households. Alternatively, it may be that rising debt levels reflect a rise in people’s 
capacity to borrow and, as such, are a reflection of good economic outcomes rather 
than a signal of greater fragility. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we begin with a 
brief discussion of previous research in the area. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data 
we will use in this project and provide an initial picture of constrained and 
unconstrained households in Australia. To better understand the relationships 
involved we then estimate a model in Section 5 to examine the demographic and 
economic characteristics of households that help explain cash flow constraints in 
Australia. We then use this model to look at how changes in these characteristics 
over time may have influenced the prevalence of cash flow constraints for 
Australian households. In Section 6 we turn our attention to the related question of 
what factors might help explain the rise in the aggregate debt to income ratio. This 
allows us to answer our motivating question: has the increase in the aggregate debt  
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to income ratio also been associated with an increase in the financial ‘fragility’ of 
households? Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Previous Research 
There has been little previous work linking debt levels to household financial 
constraints. However, there has been substantial work focusing on the closely 
related link between consumption behaviour and constraints. This work infers the 
level of household constraints from macroeconomic consumption behaviour. Other 
work of a more microeconomic nature looks directly at what factors affect people’s 
access to credit. 
Most of the macroeconomic work considers the effect of household constraints in 
the context of testing the Rational Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis 
(REPIH).1 This theory holds that households choose the path of consumption that 
maximises their expected lifetime utility. When households are forward-looking in 
this way, changes in current income should have little effect on their consumption 
patterns: it is lifetime income that matters. The seminal work in this area was done 
by Hall (1978). In Hall and in subsequent work, empirical tests have consistently 
rejected the hypothesis, showing that consumption is ‘excessively sensitive’ to 
changes in current income.2 One explanation for this excess sensitivity is the 
possible existence of liquidity constraints. If households are denied access to credit 
they will be unable to borrow against future income to optimally smooth their 
consumption. Instead, these households must resort to consuming solely out of 
current income.3 The extent to which aggregate consumption follows aggregate 
income can then be used to infer the proportion of households who are credit-
constrained. The emerging consensus is that about 20 per cent of the population are 
credit-constrained. However, these estimates do vary significantly, both across 
countries and across time. This is likely to reflect both structural and cyclical 
factors. For example, the deregulation of the financial system over the 1980s and 
                                           
1  The literature on the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption is extensive and well 
summarised by Deaton (1992), Muelbauer (1994), and Attanasio (1998). 
2  Studies that are particularly relevant to the current paper are summarised in Appendix A. 
3  For liquidity constraints to affect consumption behaviour, households must be unable to 
borrow as much as they want, face an increasing income path and be impatient enough to 
want to bring resources from the future to the present.  
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1990s is expected to have made it easier for households to access credit in most 
industrialised countries. It follows that liquidity constraints are now less likely to 
affect consumption. 
There are a number of Australian studies in this area. Debelle and Preston (1995) 
suggest that the proportion of liquidity-constrained (current income) consumers has 
fallen significantly from 40–45 per cent in the 1970s to 20–25 per cent in the 
1980s–1990s – as expected given financial deregulation. Blundell-Wignall, 
Browne and Tarditi (1995) examine similar sub-periods and find a similar decline 
in the sensitivity of consumption to current income for a large number of countries. 
However, unlike Debelle and Preston (1995) they do not find support for declining 
constraints in Australia, a result upheld by de Brouwer (1996).4 
Household level studies have also tested the REPIH. The main advantage of micro 
studies is that, in their data sets, they are generally able to directly observe 
constrained consumers rather than having to infer the presence of liquidity 
constraints. For example, Jappelli (1990) and Cox and Jappelli (1993) use the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to study the characteristics of liquidity-
constrained consumers in the US. Credit constraints can be directly observed in 
their micro data as the SCF provides information on which consumers had their 
request for credit rejected by financial institutions. Jappelli (1990) shows that 
economic characteristics (such as current income, wealth and unemployment) are 
important determinants of whether a household is credit-constrained. However, 
Jappelli (1990) also shows that demographic characteristics (such as age, marital 
status and household type) are highly significant. As such, macro studies that 
ignore demographic change may not capture changes in the true distribution of 
liquidity constraints across time. 
Cox and Jappelli (1993) estimate the extent to which borrowing constraints reduce 
the levels of debt held by credit-constrained households. They find that desired 
debt exhibits a pronounced life-cycle pattern, increasing until the age of the 
                                           
4 The disparity between the results of Blundell-Wignall et al (1995) and Debelle and 
Preston (1995) may be due to the latter’s sample period extending into a more deregulated 
financial environment during the mid 1990s. de Brouwer’s (1996) results may not be directly 
comparable as he uses a different range of proxies for liquidity constraints, none of which 
prove to be significant for Australia. Moreover, he uses annual data where Debelle and 
Preston (1995) use quarterly data.   
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household head reaches the mid-30s, and then declining. Also, the gap between 
desired and actual debt is highest for younger households, indicating that they 
would benefit most from the easing of liquidity constraints. The probability of 
being constrained falls with age and is negatively related to permanent earnings 
and net worth. Duca and Rosenthal (1993) extend their work by also examining the 
manner in which lenders vary debt limits across borrowers. They find that debt 
limits are affected by household income, wealth, credit history and ethnic 
background. 
3.  The Data 
The primary sources of data used in this paper are the Household Expenditure 
Survey (HES) for 1993/94 and 1998/99 and the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey for 2001. These surveys contain detailed 
information on expenditure, income and demographic characteristics for 
households resident in private dwellings throughout Australia.5 Both surveys 
collect information from all persons aged 15 years and over. This is mainly done 
through individual face-to-face interviews.  
The surveys differ in a number of ways. The HES collects more detailed 
expenditure data, requiring survey participants to record in a diary all their 
expenditure over a 2-week period. HILDA focuses more on economic welfare, 
labour market dynamics, family dynamics and subjective well-being. The HES is a 
cross-sectional survey that is repeated every 4 or 5 years. On the other hand, 
HILDA is a household ‘panel’ or ‘longitudinal’ survey. This means that it is also 
cross-sectional in that it surveys many households at a particular point in time, but 
it also follows these households across time. This is the first time such a 
large-scale household panel survey has been undertaken in Australia. However, 
at this stage, only the first wave of the data has become available so that 
HILDA is effectively a cross-sectional survey too. The 1993/94 HES covered 
8  389 households and nearly 23  000 people with the interviews being equally 
spread over the period July 1993 to June 1994. The 1998/99 HES was undertaken 
between July 1998 and June 1999, covering 6 892 households and 13 964 people. 
                                           
5  Both surveys exclude special dwellings (such as hospitals, institutions, nursing homes, hotels, 
and hostels) and dwellings in remote and sparsely settled parts of Australia.  
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The HILDA Survey covered 7  682 households and 13  969 people, with the 
majority of the Wave 1 data being collected between 24 August 2001 and 
21 December 2001. 
In using large cross-sectional household data sets to examine the characteristics of 
financially constrained households we closely follow the approach of several US 
studies (e.g., Jappelli (1990); Cox and Jappelli (1993); Duca and Rosenthal 
(1994)). However, these studies focus on households who have been denied access 
to credit. This kind of micro data is currently unavailable in Australia. Instead, we 
focus on measures that indicate whether households have difficulty paying their 
bills, and, by inference, are cash-constrained. In 1998/99 the HES introduced 
several ways of measuring financial fragility in households. In particular, the 
survey collected information on whether individuals: 
1. Could not pay their utility bills due to a shortage of money. 
2. Could not pay their registration or insurance on time (rent and mortgage 
in HILDA). 
3. Pawned or sold something due to a shortage of money. 
4. Went without meals due to a shortage of money. 
5. Were unable to heat their home due to a shortage of money. 
6. Sought assistance from welfare organisations due to a shortage of money. 
7. Sought financial help from friends or family due to a shortage of money. 
If a person answers ‘yes’ to any of these questions we define them as having had 
cash flow problems. Throughout the paper we will interchangeably refer to 
these people as being ‘cash flow constrained’, ‘cash constrained’, ‘financially 
constrained’, and ‘financially stressed’.6 Because the questions on financial stress 
were only asked in this form in 1998/99 we use econometric techniques to infer the 
                                           
6  However, these concepts are not quite the same as ‘credit constraints’ in the other literature.  
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proportion of constrained households in 1993/94 and 2001.7 However, we defer 
discussion of the econometrics until we have introduced the data. 
4.  Features of the Data 
Before undertaking any formal modelling, it is useful to look at some of the 
features of the data to be used in the model. The data presented in this section 
come from the HES for 1998/99. Firstly, given the importance of the cash flow 
variable in our analysis, it is of interest to look at its composition. As has already 
been stated, our proxy for cash constraints is whether a household reports having 
problems on at least one of seven dimensions of financial stress (e.g., could not 
pay their bills, had to pawn something, went without meals) – 22 per cent of 
households report being constrained on at least one of these measures. However, 
some of these measures were more common than others. 
Figure 2 shows the relative contributions of each measure of financial stress. For 
example, the first column shows that around 72 per cent of cash-constrained 
households fell into this category because they could not pay their utility bills due 
to a shortage of money. Most of the other cash flow problems can be explained by 
households being unable to pay registration or insurance on time (29 per cent) or 
because they had to ask family or friends for assistance (44 per cent).8 One other 
possible measure of cash flow problems is whether the household could raise 
$2  000 in a week as emergency money. However, around 51 per cent of 
households reporting cash flow problems on our preferred measure also reported 
being unable to raise $2  000 in a week. Furthermore, only 10 per cent of 
unconstrained households reported being unable to raise the emergency money. So 
                                           
7  HILDA asked very similar questions but differences in sampling technique lead to a large 
difference in the raw number of households that we would call cash constrained. This is why 
we use econometric techniques for 2001 as well as 1993/94. However, we are able to use the 
HILDA answers to verify our results and are thus fairly confident about our findings for 2001. 
8  Some of the other components, such as whether the household pawned or sold something 
(19 per cent), whether they were unable to heat their home (10 per cent) and whether they 
went without meals (12 per cent) may be better indicators of financial hardship rather than 
cash flow problems per se (see Bray (2001)). We experimented with different combinations 
of the various components in the model as proxies for cash flow problems, without 
significantly altering the results.  
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there is significant overlap in these measures. Finally, using the emergency money 
variable in the model does not appreciably affect the results. 
Figure 2: Measures of Financial Stress 







































Note:    (a) The relative contributions do not sum to 100 per cent as households may report being constrained 
on more than one measure (e.g., a household may have been unable to pay their bills on time and had 
to pawn something). 
Source:    ABS Household Expenditure Survey 1998/99 
Given our motivating question, it is of interest to see whether household debt and 
financial stress are related in a simple bi-variate analysis. An important limitation 
of the survey data in this regard is relevant. Debt for investment purposes is not 
directly measured by the surveys. The HES excludes debt used to purchase a 
dwelling that is rented out for more than three months in the previous year. The 
HILDA Survey asks only about debt secured against the principal place of 
residence of the household. To the extent that some investment loans may be 




It should also be noted that, given we have access to unit record file data, we 
measure debt to income ratios by dividing the outstanding stock of debt for each 
household by the level of income for each household – effectively weighting all 
households equally. Aggregate measures of debt to income ratios divide the sum of 
the total debt stock across all households by the sum of total incomes across all 
households – effectively giving more weight to higher-income households. We 
measure the debt-service ratio (mortgage repayments as a share of disposable 
income) the same way. Differences in the weighting schemes can account for 
differences in both the level and growth rates of these ratios. For instance, our 
measure of the level of the debt-service ratio (for households with debt) will tend 
to be higher than the aggregate measure because higher-income households (with 
debt) generally have lower relative debt burdens. Also, changes in the distribution 
of the debt will show up in our measures but are unlikely to affect aggregate 
measures in the same way. 
Figure 3 shows that, across all households, individuals living in lower-income 
households are more likely to suffer cash flow problems. Around 25–30 per cent of 
households in the two lowest income quintiles are cash-constrained. This falls to 
around 10 per cent for households in the highest income quintile. So while cash 
flow problems are more frequent in lower income groups, they still remain 
prominent for some households at all income levels. And while low-income 
households appear more likely to have cash flow problems, they also appear less 
likely to have debt. As a share of income, household debt stands at around 
10–30 per cent in the two lowest quintiles. It peaks at around 60–70 per cent in the 
third and fourth quintiles. On the surface, this suggests that the households holding 
debt are less likely to be financially stressed. 
However, if we focus on households with debt we can see a possible positive 
correlation between debt levels and the degree of financial stress. For households 
with debt, debt to income ratios peak in the lowest income quintiles at around 
240 per cent. Debt to income falls to around 130 per cent in the highest income 
group. For households with debt, financial stress peaks in the second quintile as 
42 per cent of households with debt in this quintile report having problems.  
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■   Housing debt – per
cent of HHDY (LHS)
–– HH with cash flow
problems – per cent
(RHS)
 
Source: ABS Household Expenditure Survey 1998/99 
A different way to look at these data is across age groups rather than income 
groups. The life-cycle model of consumption posits that younger households 
should borrow to consume in advance of future income, repay their debt and save 
through the middle years, and draw down their savings after retirement. As 
younger households have had less time to build up assets than older households, 
they are more likely to report cash flow (and other) problems, as supported by 
Figure 4.  
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Age of the household head
■   Housing debt – per
cent of HHDY (LHS)
–– HH with cash flow
problems – per cent (RHS)
55–59 45–49 35–39 25–29
 
Source: ABS Household Expenditure Survey 1998/99 
In keeping with the life-cycle model, the majority of household debt across all 
households appears to be concentrated in the middle-aged households rather than 
in young households. So, again, across all households there is only tentative 
evidence that financial fragility and the incurrence of debt are related. Reported 
cash flow problems generally fall as the household head gets older. In the case of 
the aged, the low incidence of cash flow problems may reflect prudent financial 
management, stable income flows and a capacity to draw upon assets.  
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But if we again just focus on households with debt, the youngest households 
appear to have the highest debt to income ratios, peaking at around 220 per cent in 
the 25–29 age group, reflecting the fact they are more likely to have recently taken 
out a loan. Younger households are also more likely to report having had cash flow 
problems with around 24 per cent of households in the 25–29 age group having 
suffered financial stress in the past year. For households with debt, reported cash 
flow problems also fall as the household head gets older. 
So the overall picture we glean from this is that households with debt are generally 
less likely to be cash-constrained. However, for those households that do hold 
mortgage debt, the more debt they hold the more likely they are to be financially 
constrained. To better understand the relationship between financial constraints 
and debt, and to control for various other factors, we need to employ more 
sophisticated econometric techniques and it is this to which we now turn. 
5.  Understanding Constraints Better: A Model 
5.1  Methodology 
We construct a logit model and estimate it using the cross-sectional data from the 
1998/99 HES. The results of this estimation are interesting in their own right in 
that they highlight what demographic and economic factors affect the likelihood 
that a household will be financially constrained. The model will also be used to 
predict the likely incidence of constraints using different underlying data in later 
sections. 
The specification of the logit model includes variables which economic theory 
suggests will be related to cash flow problems or which previous empirical studies 
have shown to be important determinants. The estimated logit equation is:9 
                                           
9  Clearly, it is not feasible for the household surveys to actually cover the whole Australian 
population. Instead, they sample only a small selection of households. Because the estimates 
are based on a sample of households, the estimates may not be representative of the 
population as a whole. To minimise this type of bias, all estimates are adjusted using 
sampling weights provided by the ABS. The weights are equal to the inverse of the 
probability of each household being selected from the population.  
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ln(  (1) 
where Pi is the probability of household i being financially constrained and {Xki} is 
the set of N independent (demographic and economic) variables for household i. 
We adopt the following modelling strategy: 
•   An equation including a large number of demographic, geographic and 
economic variables is initially estimated. 
•   Variables with coefficients not significant at the 5 per cent level are 
eliminated, starting with the least significant. 
•   As insignificant variables are excluded, the p-values of remaining variables 
are monitored in case of possible multi-collinearity. 
•   The final set of (mainly) significant explanatory variables forms the basis of 
the model.10 We leave in some variables of particular interest even if they are 
insignificant.11 
Variables were selected that best explain cash flow constraints in the 1998/99 
model. However, we also compromised, to some extent, on the choice of variables 
in order to allow comparisons across time. For example, we have data on the 
outstanding stock of mortgage debt for 1999 and 2001, but not for 1994. This 
                                           
10 Definitions for the variables used are available in Appendix B. 
11 Before estimating the model we had to clean the data in a number of ways. We exclude 
households with ‘unnatural’ budget or income shares. All weekly expenditure items are 
divided by weekly household disposable income to generate budget shares. Households 
reporting negative expenditures (often due to refunds) or negative incomes (mainly due to 
losses from own businesses) imply negative budget shares and are excluded. Budget shares 
exceeding 100 per cent (i.e., expenditure exceeds income) are also excluded to remove the 
effect of lumpy expenditures. For example, a household reporting mortgage payments of 
250 times their weekly income may be a data error or reflect them having paid off the whole 
loan during the survey week – in either case it is an unrepresentative observation that needs to 
be excluded. This means we exclude 99 households (1.3 per cent of the sample) in 1998/99 
and 142 households (1.8 per cent) in 2001. Also, we imputed some income observations in the 
2001 HILDA data, which are used in Section 6. Details of this procedure may be found in 
Appendix C.  
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prevented us from using a measure of home equity (the difference between 
reported dwelling value and the outstanding stock of mortgage debt), despite this 
variable being an important determinant of constraints in 1998/99. Instead, we 
simply use the reported dwelling value. We also cannot use interest payments on 
credit card and personal loan debt, despite these variables being statistically 
significant, as we do not have these data for 2001. However, tests that compared 
the models suggested that our choice of variables did not appreciably alter the 
results. 
In making comparisons across time we also need to account for the effect of 
inflation on households’ purchasing power. We do this by adjusting the household 
income and wealth figures for headline CPI inflation (which was approximately 
10 per cent between 1993/94 and 1998/99 and 11 per cent between 1998/99 and 
2001, including the effect of the GST). 
5.2  Results 
The results from the logit estimation, based on the HES 1998/99 data, are 
presented in Table 1. Since the estimated coefficients represent the effect of the 
independent variables on the logarithm of the odds of the probability rather than on 
the probability itself, we also report the partial derivatives or ‘marginal effects’, 
δ P/δ Xk, evaluated at the sample means in the last column. For continuous variables 


















For dummy variables the partial effect measures the estimated change in 
probability of a discrete change in the dummy from 0 to 1. The last column shows 
the estimated effect of a change in the variable equal to the ‘selected unit’ on the 
probability of the household being constrained. A positive sign indicates that the 




Table 1: Estimation of the Logit Equation 
Implied probabilities at sample means 
Variable  Coefficient  Sample mean  Selected unit  Marginal effect 
Age  –0.05***  47.4 years  5 years  –3.1 
Gender 0.14  38.9%  Female  1.3 
Family size  0.26***  2.6 people  1 person  3.2 
Disability  0.65***  51.2%  Disabled  5.6 
Couple without 
children 
–0.38***  24.6%  Compared to person 
living alone  
–3.2 
Couple with children  –0.25  33.3%  Compared to person 
living alone 
–2.1 
Single parent  0.32*  8.5%  Compared to person 
living alone 
2.9 
Mixed family  –0.18  9.4%  Compared to person 
living alone 
–1.6 
Home ownership  –0.68***  69.1%  Home owner  –6.2 




–4***   $716   $100  –1.2 
Dwelling value  –1.78× 10
–6***  $136 500  $25 000  –0.6 
Income from interest  –2.41***  4.5%  1% of HHY  –0.3 
Income from 
government benefits 
0.92***  3.1%  1% of HHY  0.1 
Mortgage repayments  1.62***  6.4%  1% of HHDY  0.2 
Credit cards  –0.19***  1.2  1 card  –2.3 
Credit card interest  0.55***  31.2%  Pays interest  4.9 
Constant 0.84       
Number of observations = 6 793 
LR χ 2 (17) = 995.85 
Probability that the LR > χ 2 = 0.00 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.25 
Number of cases correctly predicted = 82 per cent  




5.2.1  Demographic variables 
On the basis of the logit model, Figures 5 and 6 plot the marginal effects of age 
and family size on the estimated probability of being financially constrained, 
holding all other variables constant at their sample means. 
Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Age 
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From Figure 5 and Table 1, as the age of the household head rises by 5 years, the 
likelihood of being cash-constrained is estimated to fall by 3.1 percentage points, 
on average. On the supply side, adverse selection in lending markets may lead to 
credit rationing for younger households as there is likely to be greater uncertainty 
over the future income streams of younger households and they are also less likely 
to have accumulated financial assets that could be used as collateral. On the 
demand side, cash flow constraints are likely to be tighter in the formative years of 
a household, given that desired consumption tends to be high relative to current 
labour income.  
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Because our data are not a panel we cannot rule out the possibility that this 
represents a cohort effect rather than an age effect. It may be that today’s older 
people, as a result of the experiences they had when growing up, especially during 
World War II, go cold and eat less when they have liquidity problems, but rarely 
get behind on payments or seek assistance (or admit to it). It follows that they will 
be less likely to be cash-constrained according to our measure. Similarly, younger 
people may have different attitudes to debt and bills. It may be the case that 
younger households are choosing not to pay their bills (but are still classified as 
constrained) rather than being unable to pay their bills. Ultimately, this reflects the 
limitations of our data. 
Figure 6 reveals that constraints are estimated to become tighter with more 
dependents, suggesting that, as families get bigger, their desired consumption 
increases relative to their income. An additional person in the household increases 
the probability of cash flow problems by 3.2 percentage points, on average. 
In terms of household structure, the probability of couples without children being 
financially constrained is 3.2 percentage points lower than for persons living alone, 
on average. Both demand and supply effects are likely to work in the direction of 
relaxing the constraint for couples without dependents. For instance, they may   
have a lower level of desired consumption because of economies of scale in 
consumption (of both durables and non-durables). On the supply side, they could 
be given more credit because loans may be jointly underwritten. On the other hand, 
the probability of single parents with dependents being constrained is 
2.9 percentage points higher than for persons living alone, ceteris paribus.  
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Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Family Size 
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5.2.2  Economic variables 
Home ownership is correlated with fewer cash flow problems. The likelihood that 
home owners (with and without a mortgage) are constrained is 6.2 percentage 
points lower, on average, than for renters. The number of unemployed persons in 
the household is also a strong determinant of cash flow problems. If a household 
member becomes unemployed, the household is nearly 5 percentage points more 
likely to be constrained, on average.  
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Figures 7 and 8 plot the marginal effects of weekly income and housing wealth on 
the predicted probability of being constrained, ceteris paribus. As we can see in 
Figure 7, a $100 increase in weekly household income reduces the probability of 
being cash-constrained by 1.2 percentage points, on average. However, most of the 
effect of income on cash flow occurs at low-income levels. For instance, the 
probability of being constrained declines by about 13 percentage points when 
household income rises from $0 to $1  000 per week. It only falls a further 
6 percentage points when income rises from $1 000 to $2 000. 
Dwelling value is also a good predictor of financial constraints. An increase in 
dwelling value of $25  000 reduces the likelihood of being constrained by 
0.6 percentage points, on average (Figure 8). 
Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Household Income 
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Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Dwelling Value 
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Figure 9 shows that the greater the share of income sourced from interest the less 
likely a household is to be constrained. Increasing the share of income earned from 
interest by 1 per cent reduces the probability of being cash-constrained by 
0.3 percentage points. This is presumably because these households are wealthier 
and/or hold higher levels of precautionary savings to effectively buffer against 
adverse cash flow movements. Conversely, a 1 per cent rise in the share of income 
coming from government benefits is estimated to increase the likelihood of being 
financially constrained by 0.1 percentage points. The significant, albeit mild, effect 
of this variable is unsurprising given that cash-constrained households include a 
higher proportion of pension recipients such as the unemployed, the disabled and 
the elderly.  
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Figure 9: Marginal Effect of Income from Interest and Government Benefits 
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5.2.3  Interest-sensitive variables 
A 1 per cent rise in mortgage debt (as a share of income) increases the probability 
of the average household being constrained by 0.2 percentage points, all other 
things being equal (Figure 10). While the magnitude of the effect is not large, it is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  
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Figure 10: Marginal Effect of Mortgage Debt 
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As Figure 11 shows, a higher number of credit cards is correlated with less binding 
constraints, on average. Having an additional credit card is associated with a fall in 
the probability of being cash-constrained of 2.3 percentage points, ceteris paribus. 
This most likely reflects the fact that banks are less likely to issue credit cards to 
high-risk households. As such, this variable may be related to whether households 
have been denied credit – the variable used in some US studies. 
Importantly, if any member of the household pays interest on their credit card, the 
probability of the household being constrained is estimated to rise by 
4.9 percentage points, all other things being equal. However, the overall effect of 
the credit card debt-service burden is small, as credit card interest payments 
generally constitute a small share of the weekly household budget.  
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Figure 11: Marginal Effect of Credit Card Ownership 
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Finally, there are some interesting differences between constrained and 
unconstrained households. As Table 2 reveals, the average mortgage debt-service 
ratio is higher for constrained households at 6.6 per cent of disposable income, 
compared to 6.3 per cent for unconstrained households. When mortgage 
repayments are split into principal and interest it becomes clear that the 
composition of the burden differs significantly between the two groups. On 
average, mortgage interest payments take a greater share of income for constrained 
households. Conversely, greater cash flow for unconstrained households allows 
them to make more voluntary excess repayments, so their principal debt payments 
are higher.  
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Table 2: Comparing Constrained and Unconstrained Households 
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Notes:    Standard errors in parentheses. 
    (a) Our measure of interest paid (relative to disposable income) of 3.2 per cent for the full sample is 
significantly below the aggregate measure of 4.7 per cent in 1998/99. This is mainly due to the 
aggregate measure giving greater weight to higher-income households. Also, our debt-service ratio 
only includes standard mortgage interest payments. If we calculate interest paid (relative to disposable 
income) on a basis comparable to the aggregate measure, we find a reasonably consistent estimate of 
4.4 per cent. 
 
5.3  What Has Happened Over Time? 
In this section we take the model estimated on the 1998/99 data, and apply it 
separately to the data from the 1993/94 HES and 2001 HILDA Survey to 
investigate how the factors that influence financial constraints may have changed 
over time. That is, we look at how the demographic and economic variables (that 
our model finds are significant) have evolved over time and, using our model, 
predict what may have happened to household constraints. We adopt this 
procedure because the 1993/94 HES did not ask the particular questions on 
financial fragility, while the 2001 HILDA Survey’s financial fragility questions 
elicited very different answers suggesting that they are not directly comparable 
with the HES questions and answers.  
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5.3.1  Comparing the HES and HILDA 
The raw data from HILDA for 2001 suggest that approximately 30 per cent of 
households in the sample have experienced some form of financial constraints. 
This is significantly higher than the 22 per cent found in the HES for 1998/99. On 
the face of it this would suggest that constraints have risen significantly in the two 
years between surveys. 
However, it seems more likely that the difference in reported cash flow problems is 
mainly the result of the relevant questions in the HES being administered on a 
face-to-face basis whereas the HILDA financial stress questions were self-
administered. If respondents see the answers to some of these questions as 
sensitive or embarrassing then the likelihood of obtaining truthful responses will be 
reduced by the presence of the interviewer. Some respondents may be reluctant to 
admit that they have asked for financial help from others or, for example, actually 
went without meals because of money problems. This reluctance will be most 
likely to occur when the question is posed directly by an interviewer in the home 
situation (as was the case with the financial stress questions in the HES).12 
To investigate this further, we look at the results we get if we use the 2001 data 
with the 1998/99 model and also if we estimate a 2001 model and apply it to the 
1998/99 HES data. Doing so, we find that while the constant is higher in 2001, the 
slope coefficients and marginal effects are broadly the same for the two models, 
both in magnitude and significance. In other words, there does not appear to have 
been any change in the cross-sectional relationships between the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variables, merely a change in the level.13 Secondly, the 
predicted change in cash constraints between the two periods from both models are 
                                           
12 A change in the wording of the questions may also explain the rise in reported problems. The 
HES asks one respondent, speaking on behalf of the household, to think about the household’s 
financial position while HILDA asks each person in the household to think about their own 
personal finances. Larger households may be more likely to have at least one person suffering 
from financial stress and so the household as a whole would be counted as being in distress. 
But, alternatively, larger households provide greater opportunities for intra-household income 
transfers and therefore are less likely to have cash flow problems. However, even single-
person households reported higher cash flow problems in 2001, presumably a household type 
where the distinction between the household and the individual disappears. 
13 This is confirmed in a pooled regression where dummies are interacted with all the estimated 
coefficients to allow for different cross-sectional relationships across time.   
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roughly similar. Thus, the 1998/99 model predicts that the proportion of 
constrained households falls by 3.6 percentage points from 1998/99 to 2001 and 
the 2001 model predicts a fall of 4.9 percentage points which, given the higher 
level involved, is roughly similar in percentage terms. Thus, there is some question 
about the actual level of constraints but less about the relative change.14  
Given all this, we believe that the model we have estimated is fairly robust across 
time. On this basis we report the results from the 1998/99 model across all time 
periods. This allows us to focus on the main demographic and economic factors 
driving the changes in financial constraints over time without worrying about the 
changes induced by the change in survey between 1998/99 and 2001. 
5.3.2  Changes in key variables 
The base model estimates that financial constraints have fallen from 22.5 per cent 
of households in 1993/94 to 18.9 per cent in 2001. Table 3 shows how some of the 
key explanatory variables in the model have contributed to this estimated change in 
the level of constraints in Australia between 1994 and 2001. A positive sign in 
either of the last two columns indicates that the variable is estimated to have 
contributed to increased cash constraints over the period. 
Table 3: Marginal Effects of Key Explanatory Variables 
Variable Sample  means    Marginal effects 











(1999 $)  123 200  136 500  157 800    –0.33  –0.48 
Income from interest 
(% HHY)  5.0 4.5 2.5    0.12 0.62 
 
While our base regression estimated that demographic variables were important 
explanators of cash constraints, most of them did not change significantly over the 
sample period. Thus, demographic variables are not estimated to have contributed 
                                           
14 The results of this exercise are available from the authors upon request.  
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significantly to the estimated relaxation in constraints. This is unsurprising given 
the relatively short period of seven years between the three surveys. 
Relatively strong economic growth and rising housing wealth from 1994 to 2001 
are estimated to have contributed the most to relaxing constraints in Australia over 
this period. Combined, growth in real income and wealth are predicted to have 
reduced the probability of being cash-constrained by around 0.9 percentage points 
between 1994 and 1999 and a further 1 percentage point between 1999 and 2001, 
ceteris paribus. 
Our model predicts that an increase in the mortgage debt-service ratio raises the 
probability of an average household being constrained, though the effect is 
relatively small. Ceteris paribus, it increased the probability of being constrained 
by 0.2 percentage points between 1993/94 and 2001. 
In addition, the model predicts that the fall in income earned from interest has 
increased constraints.15 The share of household income sourced from interest fell 
from 5 per cent in 1993/94 to 2.5 per cent in 2001, partly offsetting the positive 
effect of economic growth. More significantly, the number of respondents 
reporting zero weekly interest income rises from around 30 per cent of the 
population in 1994 to 73 per cent of the population in 2001. This is estimated to 
have increased the likelihood of a given household being cash-constrained by 
0.74 percentage points, ceteris paribus. 
However, we have reason to question the change in this variable. The fall in 
interest income can be explained by lower retail deposit and investment rates, 
leading to a reduction in the interest paid on existing accounts. But this effect may 
have seen household savings redirected towards higher-return investments. This is 
supported at the aggregate level as households have redirected their wealth into 
shares and other equity at the expense of interest-bearing accounts. Household 
wealth held in cash and interest-bearing deposits at banks has fallen (as a 
percentage of the total stock of household financial assets) by around 5–6 per cent 
between 1993/94 and 2000/01. If this is true, we cannot conclude that the fall in 
                                           
15 Income from interest includes interest receipts from savings accounts, debentures, bonds, 
trusts, and personal loans to persons outside the household. It excludes income from 
superannuation, property income and income from royalties and dividends on shares.  
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savings has led to more binding constraints as households are simply holding their 
wealth in other assets. Thus, households may have been less constrained in 2001 
than our model indicates. 
In addition to the income from interest variables, there are a number of other 
explanatory variables that are likely to be problematic when making comparisons 
across surveys. We remove the partial effects for the number of credit cards owned 
by the household, whether households pay interest on their credit cards, whether a 
disabled person lives in the household, and how much household income is 
sourced from interest and government benefits. Once all these adjustments are 
made, our preferred model predicts that financial constraints have only fallen 
slightly between 1993/94 and 2001 from 24.1 per cent to 21.6 per cent. We do not 
consider this substantially different from the base model, and the numbers tell 
essentially the same story. 
6.  Analysis and Implications 
While the results so far are interesting in their own right, they also provide us with 
a framework with which to address some other related issues. For instance, we are 
now in a position to reconcile the household evidence on debt to income ratios 
with the aggregate evidence presented in the introduction. Also, by examining the 
characteristics of the households taking on debt we can draw out some implications 
for financial fragility. 
6.1  Components of the Rise in the Aggregate Debt to Income Ratio 
Between September 1993 and December 2001, the period covered by the three 
surveys, the aggregate debt to income ratio rose by nearly 51 percentage points and 
this may reflect three separate effects: 
1.  Households that hold debt hold higher levels of debt; and/or 
2.  The proportion of households that hold debt has increased; or  
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3.  More debt is held by higher-income households, all other things being 
equal.16 
Table 4: Contributions to Changes in Aggregate Debt to Income Ratio 
 1993/94  1998/99  2001 
Proportion of HHs with at least one outstanding loan  72%  76%  N/A 
Proportion of HHs with at least one home loan  28%  30%  32% 
Proportion of HHs with at least one standard mortgage
(a)  26%  29%  29% 
Average level of housing debt (1999 $) (HH with debt)  N/A  $76 500  $87 200 
Average disposable income (1999 $) (HH with debt)  $45 800  $48 000  $51 600 
Average housing debt to income ratio (HH with debt)  N/A  177%  212% 
Average housing debt to income ratio  N/A  53%  67% 
Average mortgage repayments to income ratio 
(HH with debt) 
23% 24% 24% 
Average mortgage repayments to income ratio  6.1%  6.4%  7.3% 
Notes:  (a) Each of the surveys asks slightly different questions so it is very difficult to be definitive about trends 
in housing-related lending. An alternative measure can be obtained from the Census. The Census 
classifies the person’s house either as ‘fully owned’, ‘being purchased’, ‘being rented’, or ‘other’. If the 
respondent says it is ‘being purchased’ they are classified as having a mortgage. The Census data suggests 
that 28.5 per cent of households had a mortgage in 1991, 27.2 per cent in 1996 and 28.6 per cent in 2001. 
Alternatively, both the HES and HILDA specifically ask how many loans the household has and the 
purposes of those loans. In particular, the HES asks whether the housing loans are ‘to buy/build the 
principal dwelling’, ‘to buy or build other property’ (generally holiday homes and short-lived investment 
properties), and ‘loans for alterations and additions to the principal dwelling and other property’. The 
HILDA Survey asks for loans from financial institutions or family and friends taken out to help pay for 
the principal dwelling and other home loans secured against the property (e.g., home equity loans). Our 
broader measure of housing debt includes all these types of loans in the HES and HILDA while the 
standard measure shown here is calculated on a comparable basis to the Census and broadly matches 
those numbers. 
 
                                           
16 The aggregate debt to income ratio is the weighted average of individual debt to income ratios 
where the weights are the shares of each household in total income. So if higher-income 
households (with greater weights) incur proportionately more debt, the aggregate debt to 
income ratio can rise even at constant household debt to income ratios. For example, suppose 
there are only two households, A and B. Household A earns $50 000 and Household B earns 
$100 000. Initially, suppose Household A has $10 000 in debt (and Household B has no debt). 
The average household debt to income ratio will be 10 per cent while the aggregate debt to 
income ratio will be 6.7 per cent. Suppose instead that Household B takes out a loan at the 
same debt to income ratio (i.e., a $20 000 loan). If Household A were now to repay its loan, 
the average household debt to income ratio would still be 10 per cent but the aggregate debt to 
income ratio would have risen to 13 per cent.  
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The data in Table 4 suggest that all of these factors have been at work. Most 
importantly, a large part of the rise in the aggregate debt to income ratio appears to 
be explained by households now taking on higher levels of debt, on average. 
Secondly, we see that around 72 per cent of all households had at least one loan in 
1993/94 and this increased to 76 per cent in 1998/99. And while we cannot 
compare these figures to the total number of loans in 2001 as we have imperfect 
data on credit cards and personal loans, we can use the number of housing loans as 
a proxy, especially as housing loans are likely to dominate the aggregate debt 
stock. Thus, while the data suggest that the proportion of people who hold standard 
mortgages has not increased significantly over the period, there has apparently 
been a rise in the proportion of households holding other types of housing-related 
loans, such as home equity loans, secured against their principal place of residence.  
We can also examine the effect of distributional factors using household survey 
data. In general, we know that households at the lower end of the income 
distribution account for less than proportionate amounts of debt while high-income 
households account for more than their proportionate share of debt.17 Calculating 
the aggregate debt to income ratio based on the survey data, we find that the 
aggregate debt to income ratio grew by 12.3 per cent between 1998/99 and 2001. 
Doing the same for the average debt to income ratio, we find that the average debt 
to income ratio grew by 15.3 per cent between 1998/99 and 2001. As such, the 
aggregate measure (which gives greater weight to higher-income households) grew 
by less than the average measure (which gives equal weight to all households). 
This implies that there is now a more equal distribution of debt through the income 
distribution with lower-income households holding proportionately more debt in 
2001 than in 1998/99. This distributional effect would serve to hold the aggregate 
debt to income ratio down, all other things being equal, compared with the average 
debt to income ratio reported in our tables. 
So, while there has been a relatively small rise in the proportion of households with 
housing debt, in percentage terms it appears that the growth in the average size of 
loans has been the main contributor to the rise in the aggregate debt to income 
                                           
17 Very high income households, those representing around the top 15 per cent of the aggregate 
income stock (which corresponds, approximately, to the top 5 per cent of households in the 
income distribution), account for less than their proportionate share of debt – as might be 
expected of very wealthy households.  
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ratio. Slightly offsetting this, there has been a redistribution of debt to lower-
income households and this has served to hold down growth in the aggregate debt 
to income ratio, relative to what it would have been had there been no change in 
the distribution. 
6.2  Financial Fragility 
To gain a better understanding of whether the increase in debt to income ratios is 
associated with greater financial fragility we look at the split between constrained 
and unconstrained households. In particular, we look at who is holding the higher 
levels of debt. 
We are able to divide the sample into cash-constrained and unconstrained 
households on the basis of their actual responses to the questions about financial 
fragility in 1998/99 and in 2001. However, as the questions are unavailable for 
1993/94 we need to adopt a different procedure to examine the characteristics of 
constrained and unconstrained households in 1993/94. One way of doing this 
would be to generate the predicted probability of being constrained for each 
household, based on the 1998/99 model, and then choosing some arbitrary cut-off 
to divide them into the two classes (e.g., less than 50 per cent predicted probability 
of being constrained means they are unconstrained, greater than 50 per cent 
predicted probability means they are constrained). However, this can be misleading 
when the distribution of cash flow problems is skewed towards one end (i.e., in the 
model many households are predicted to be a 30–40 per cent chance of being 
constrained). Instead, we ‘weight’ each household by their predicted probability of 
being constrained. If we then sum across these weighted estimates, we get an 
estimate for the average constrained household.18 
                                           
18 For example, suppose there were only two households (A and B) in the economy. Household 
A earns $100 a week while Household B earns $200 a week. Suppose Household A has a 
70 per cent chance of being constrained while Household B has only a 30 per cent chance of 
being constrained. Then applying these weights to both households ($100 x 70/(30+70) for 
Household A and $200 x 30/(30+70) for Household B) and summing across the weighted 
estimates ($70 + $60) gives us the income of the average constrained household ($130). This 
can be compared with the estimate of $100 (Household A) that we would get if we used a cut-
off between 0.3 and 0.7 probability.  
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From Table 5 we can see that our measure of the proportion of households that 
hold debt has been rising for both constrained and unconstrained households. This 
is likely to reflect the fact that access to debt, for example, through access to home 
equity loans, has improved for most households following the deregulation of the 
Australian financial sector. And while both groups have been taking on higher debt 
levels, unconstrained households appear to have taken on proportionately more 
debt than constrained households, on average. Conversely, growth in average 
disposable income has been more pronounced amongst unconstrained households 
over the period. 
Table 5: Comparing Constrained and Unconstrained Households 
   1993/94  1998/99  2001 
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Overall, comparing the changes in the debt to income ratios of constrained and 
unconstrained households between 1998/99 and 2001, the debt to income ratio of 
constrained households has risen from 61 per cent to 69 per cent while the debt to 
income ratio of unconstrained households has risen from 51 per cent to 67 per cent 
– a considerably larger increase. Thus, it appears that the rise in the aggregate debt 
to income ratio is mainly the result of unconstrained households voluntarily taking 
on higher levels of debt.  
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And while we noted earlier that the housing debt to income ratio has increased for 
both groups, the mortgage debt-service burden is often seen as a better measure of 
households’ capacity to service debt. The average mortgage debt burden has 
actually increased more for unconstrained households (from 6.0 per cent to 
7.4 per cent) than for constrained households (from 6.5 per cent to 7.3 per cent). 
Among those constrained households that actually have a mortgage, the average 
mortgage debt burden has remained roughly constant at around 25–27 per cent 
between 1993/94 and 2001. We also know that the interest burden for these 
households fell from around 16 per cent in 1993/94 to 14 per cent of disposable 
income in 1998/99. This is partly explained by falling lending rates over the 
period. So while there is tentative evidence that constrained households are taking 
on more interest-sensitive debt, their capacity to service this debt (as measured by 
the debt burden) has not worsened, on average. As such, their financial fragility is 
likely to have remained relatively unchanged. 
There is stronger evidence that unconstrained households are taking on more debt 
and in increasing amounts. This is reflected in the fact that the mortgage 
repayments (as a share of disposable income) of unconstrained households appear 
to have increased more than for constrained households. Moreover, there are now 
more unconstrained households than there were in the past. This suggests that 
relatively strong economic growth and falling nominal interest rates more than 
offset the increase in household indebtedness over this period. So, in summary, 
most of the rise in household debt at the aggregate level appears to be explained 
not only by more unconstrained households taking on debt, but also by 
unconstrained households taking on increasing amounts of debt. 
7.  Conclusion 
Using the 1998/99 HES data, a logit model was constructed to examine the 
relationship between the probability of being financially constrained and the 
economic and demographic characteristics of households in Australia. The 
proportion of Australian households that were cash-constrained in 1998/99 is 
around 22 per cent, which is broadly consistent with the findings of previous 
macroeconomic studies in Australia. Whether a household is constrained is 
significantly determined by demographic variables such as age, unemployment,  
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disability and marital status. Important economic variables include home 
ownership, weekly household income, the proportion of income earned from 
interest and the share of income going to repayments on mortgage debt. 
We also apply the model to the 1993/94 HES data and the 2001 HILDA data to 
determine whether the proportion of financially constrained consumers is likely to 
have changed over time and, if it has, to identify which economic and demographic 
variables may have been driving the change. Despite both economic and 
demographic variables being important determinants of cash flow constraints, only 
the economic variables have changed significantly between the sample periods. 
Relatively strong economic growth is predicted to have relaxed financial 
constraints through growth in earnings, growth in housing wealth and falling 
unemployment. Partly offsetting this, rising mortgage repayments (as a share of 
income) and increasing credit card debt are predicted to have increased constraints. 
Putting these effects together at the aggregate level, we estimate that fewer 
households are now constrained. In 1994, 24.1 per cent of Australian households 
are estimated to have been constrained; this falls to 22.5 per cent in 1999, before 
falling marginally to a projected 21.6 per cent in 2001 (based on our preferred 
model). On balance, it appears that the overall level of cash constraints in the 
economy has fallen. However, the magnitude of the fall is small due to numerous 
offsetting effects. 
To further examine changes in household fragility, we separate the sample into 
cash-constrained and unconstrained households and examine whether important 
changes have occurred within the two groups. The mortgage debt-service ratio has 
hardly changed for constrained households, on average, suggesting that they are no 
more fragile than in the past. And while there appears to have been a rise in the 
proportion of constrained households who have incurred at least one form of debt, 
the relative size of this sector of the community has fallen, as there are fewer 
constrained households in 2001 than in the mid 1990s. 
Accordingly, despite the increase in the aggregate household debt to income ratio 
to historically high levels, we find little evidence that Australian households are 
now significantly more financially fragile than in the past. Much of the rise in debt 
appears to have been due to unconstrained households. There are now more  
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unconstrained households in the population and it is these households that are 
primarily responsible for the increase in household debt. Indeed, the rise in the 
aggregate debt to income ratio seems to reflect households reacting to increased 
household income and low unemployment rather than being an indicator of 
increased household financial distress or fragility. 
Hence, in summary, we find no evidence of an increase in financial fragility from 
the rise in debt associated with owner-occupier mortgages. This does not preclude 
an increase in fragility for those households that have significantly increased their 
exposure to investment housing. Information on this will become available with 
the next wave of HILDA data.  
3
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Appendix A: Previous Studies on Liquidity Constraints 
Table A1: Studies Estimating the Proportion of Liquidity-constrained Consumers 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Dependent variable 
ANYCFPRO = 1 if the household had cash flow problems in the past year and 0 if 
not. 
Demographic variables 
AGE = age of the household head (years). 
GENDER = 1 if household head is a female and 0 if not. 
FAMILY SIZE = number of usual residents in the household. 
DISABILITY/HEALTH = 1 if household has a person with a disability or health 
condition and 0 if not. 
COUPLE NO CHILD = 1 if couple without children and 0 if not. 
COUPLE CHILD = 1 if couple with children (either 0–14 or 15+ years or both) 
and 0 if not. 
SINGLE PARENT = 1 if lone parent with children (either 0–14 or 15+ years or 
both) and 0 if not. 
MIXED FAMILY = 1 if mixed families in household and 0 if not. 
Economic variables 
HOME OWNER = 1 if home owner or home buyer and 0 if renting from landlord, 
government housing authority or other. 
UNEMPLOYED = number of unemployed persons in the household. 
DWELLING VALUE = estimated dwelling value ($).  
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DISPOSABLE INCOME = total weekly household disposable income (gross 
weekly income minus imputed tax) ($). 
INCOME FROM GOVT BENEFITS = household income from government 
benefits as a proportion of total weekly household gross income (%). 
Interest-sensitive variables 
INCOME FROM INTEREST = household income from interest as a proportion of 
total weekly household gross income (%). 
MORTGAGE DEBT = household mortgage repayments as a proportion of total 
weekly household disposable income (%). 
CREDIT CARDS = number of credit cards in the household. 




Appendix C: Imputation of Household Income in HILDA19 
Compared with similar international household surveys, HILDA does not suffer 
greatly from problems of missing data (Watson and Wooden 2003). However, 
there is a relatively high incidence of missing data for income-related questions. 
We can separate the most common reasons for the missing data into ‘item 
non-response’ and ‘incomplete households’. Item non-response occurs when a 
member of a selected household agrees to be interviewed, but then either refuses, 
or is unable, to answer some of the questions asked. This is the main source of 
missing data, accounting for 64 per cent of the missing household income 
information. Most of the missing income data is due to item non-response for 
income sourced from business (missing 23.5 per cent) and investments (missing 
8.1 per cent). Wages and salaries (missing 7.2 per cent) and government benefits 
and pensions (missing 1.4 per cent) have relatively low incidences of missing data. 
The other major source of missing data is the 810 incomplete households, 
accounting for 10.5 per cent of the household sample and 36 per cent of the 
missing household income information; these are households in which not all 
eligible adult members agreed, or were able, to be interviewed. The HILDA unit 
record files do not include an entry for household income if any of its eligible 
members were not interviewed, or did not report complete income information; in 
all, 29 per cent of households have a missing value for household income. 
In such circumstances we have two choices. We can drop the 29 per cent of 
households for which income data is missing from the sample, or impute the 
income of the individuals with missing data. Our choice to impute income for 
missing individuals is shaped by two factors. First, because income non-response 
is not random or uncorrelated with the variable(s) of interest, the missing cases 
cannot be safely dropped from the sample (Watson and Wooden 2003). For 
example, men, individuals outside the labour force, individuals living in Tasmania 
and Perth, people that have been recently divorced, and people that have a high 
regard for their leisure time (and generally have low incomes) were more likely to 
offer complete income information than other individuals. Second, we have a large 
                                           
19  The work in Appendix C was done by Gianni La Cava and Jeremy Lawson. Further 
discussion of the income imputation procedure may be found in Ellis, Lawson and 
Roberts-Thomson (2003).  
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cross-section of information from the HILDA Survey that permits us to do a 
reasonable job of imputing income for missing individuals. 
Following the recommendations of the HILDA Survey team and methods adopted 
in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we impute income using the 
‘predictive mean matching’ method (Little 1988; Watson and Wooden 2003). This 
is a stochastic imputation technique that has the advantage of maintaining the 
underlying data distribution by allowing the imputation of error around the mean. 
The nature of the missing data leaves us with the need to impute income for three 
separate types of missing cases: 
1.  Individuals that did not complete a person questionnaire and therefore did 
not report any income information (Type I) (n = 1 158). 
2.  Individuals that completed a person questionnaire but did not provide 
information on wage income (Type II) (n = 673). 
3.  Individuals that completed a person questionnaire but did not provide 
information on non-wage income (Type III) (n = 1 621). 
Three separate models are estimated to impute income for each type of missing 
case. For Type I respondents we have information on the characteristics of their 
household (e.g., value of the dwelling, geographic location, the number of 
bedrooms) and a limited range of personal information from the household 
questionnaire. We also have personal information collected about other 
respondents in the household. These ‘family variables’ include the income, labour 
force status and occupation of other household members. Both the household and 
family variables are likely to be correlated with both personal and household 
income and hence act as useful explanatory variables in the model. We impute 
total gross financial year income for these individuals. 
We have the same information for Types II and III respondents, but also additional 
personal information obtained from items that they did complete during the 
interview – labour force status, age, gender, English-speaking background – 
including information about the sources of their income. This allows us to predict  
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wage and non-wage income in the final two models, and add the income that 
individuals report from other sources to our estimates. For example, for Type III 
individuals we add their imputed non-wage income to any actual reported wage 
and salary income. 
In the regression model for Type I households our model explains nearly 
32 per cent of the variation in total gross household income. The root mean square 
error (RMSE) is about $26 000. In the regression model for Type II households our 
model explains about 46 per cent of the variation in individuals’ wage and salary 
income and the RMSE is nearly $19 000. In the regression model for Type III 
households our model explains nearly 21 per cent of the variation in individuals’ 
non-wage income and the RMSE is about $20 500. Although these errors are quite 
large, we regard the imputation as being relatively successful, not least because it 
allows us to use actual data for other income and household members that would 
otherwise be lost. The actual results from the three regression models are available 
from the authors upon request. 
Our income imputation strategy allows us to recover household income estimates 
for all but 337 households (about 4 per cent of the sample), ensuring that any bias 
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